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Abstract
This paper studies the e¤ect of competition on executive compensation. We estimate
the e¤ect of increased product market competition on the performance-pay sensitivity of
CEOs, and contrast it with the e¤ect for department managers and other workers in the
corporation. We use a recent reform that simplied rm entry regulation in Portugal as
a quasi-natural experiment. The empirical strategy exploits the staggered implementation
of the reform across municipalities. Using linked employer-employee data for the universe
of workers and rms, we show that increased product market competition, following the
reform, decreased the sensitivity of pay to performance of CEOs and other managers, with
no signicant e¤ects found for other workers. These ndings are consistent with existing
theoretical results in a principal-agent framework that a fall in entry costs leads to weaker
managerial incentives.
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1 Introduction
The pay of CEOs and other top executives has received wide attention recently from both
policymakers and academic researchers. The main reason is the sharp increase in recent decades
in top executives pay relative to that of other workers in the rm. For example, Bertrand (2009)
argues that by 2005 the median US CEOs pay was 110 times higher than the average workers,
compared with 30 times in the 1970s. For the UK, Bell and Van Reenen (2013) show that the
ratio for the FTSE-100 CEOs went from 11 in 1980 to 116 in 2010. The key question for many
is whether top executives are worth so much and this frequently comes down to the link between
their pay and the performance of the rms they manage. The empirical research reviewed in
Bertrand (2009) suggests that executive pay is correlated with measures of rm performance,
but that there is more to CEO pay than just this - Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), for
example, show that CEOs are also rewarded for luck.
In this paper we take an empirical approach to a relatively neglected aspect of CEOs
performance-related pay - the way in which it is a¤ected by product market competition. The
link between competition and managerial incentives has certainly attracted theoretical attention
- see, for example, Schmidt (1997) and Raith (2003) - but this has not been fully exploited em-
pirically. In particular, Raith has predicted that the link depends critically on the way in which
competition is increased: while increases due to increased substitutability between varieties or
increased market size will strengthen the links between pay and performance, increases induced
by reducing barriers to entry will weaken them. The existing empirical literature - e.g. Burgess
and Metcalfe (2000) and Cuñat and Guadalupe (2005 and 2009) - discusses only the former,
whereas we, uniquely we believe, discuss the latter case. Taken together, their and our work
constitutes a test of  and as it turns out a validation of - Raiths predictions.
The analysis of entry barriers is of considerable practical and policy importance. Many
countries have sought over the last decade to increase product market competition through
entry deregulation, and as cash-strapped governments seek ways of stimulating growth without
incurring public expenditure this trend is likely to continue. Moreover, in one sector in which
performance-related pay is sometimes thought to have got out of hand  the banking sector 
there is also great concern about barriers to entry keeping competition low. Our results, which
show that reducing entry barriers in Portugal reduced the strength of the performance-pay link,
hint that perhaps the two issues are related.
We investigate the e¤ect of entry deregulation on both the xed and the variable components
of managers pay, focussing particularly on the latter, which is a function of rm performance.
We assess whether the sensitivity of pay to rm performance changes with product market
competition, for CEOs and department managers relative to other workers in the rm. We use
linked employer-employee data for the universe of private sector rms and workers in Portugal,
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and exploit the "On the Spot Firm" program, introduced in 2005 with the purpose of reducing
the cost of entry and the complexity of the process of registering a new rm. To register a
business prior to 2005, an entrepreneur would need to visit several public o¢ces; it took on
average 78 days to complete the 11 procedures required and cost about 13.5% of GDP per
capita. The "On the Spot Firm" program created one-stop shops where entrepreneurs could
register a company in a single visit, in about one hour and at a cost of about 3% of GDP per
capita. Between 2005 and 2010, Portugal rose from 113th to 26th in the World Banks "Doing
Business" ranking.
The "On the Spot Firm" o¢ces were initially opened in a few municipalities and in the
following years the program expanded to municipalities across the country.1 We exploit this
cross-time and cross-municipality variation in the implementation of the reform to estimate
the e¤ect on the structure of compensation of managers. Using the roll-out of the program
as an exogenous source of increased rm entry and product market competition, we provide
quasi-natural experimental evidence on the e¤ect of entry deregulation on the performance-pay
sensitivity for managers and other workers in the rm, and on the xed component of compens-
ation. The linked employer-employee data (LEED) Quadros de Pessoal (QP) has unusually
rich and detailed information, such as the workers gender, age, education, occupation, type of
contract of employment, hiring date in the rm, hours of work and earnings, split into each of
its components; and the rms industry, location, total employment, number of establishments,
sales volume, legal structure and ownership structure. The data thus allows us to obtain estim-
ates that control for observed worker and rm characteristics, and for unobserved individual-
or match (rm-worker)-specic heterogeneity, as well as changes in industry composition and
regional characteristics.
We merge the linked employer-employee data with balance sheet data containing information
on the rms performance, to estimate the slope of the performance-pay relationship and how
it changed after the deregulation of entry. The fact that our data cover the universe of private
sector rms and all of their workers is a signicant advantage relative to most existing studies
which have focussed on top executives only in the largest rms. The main challenge in studies
of competition is how to measure it empirically. Commonly used measures of competition, such
as concentration ratios or the Herndahl-Hirschman index face a number of clear limitations,
including potential endogeneity, correlation with omitted variables and non-monotonicity of
their e¤ects on outcome variables (Sutton, 1991). Our use of the "On the Spot Firm" program
as a quasi-natural experiment that increased rm entry allows us to identify the causal link
between competition and performance-based pay of executives more cleanly, avoiding the caveats
required of the more common measures of competition.
1By the end of 2009 there were 164 one-stop shops dispersed throughout Portugal (see Figure 1 in Fernandes
et al. (2014).
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We show that the "On the Spot Firm" reform increased rm entry and that in line with
Raiths theoretical prediction, the resultant increase in competition decreased the slope of
performance-based pay for CEOs, but not for department managers or other workers. Our
empirical specications control for individual worker xed e¤ects, thus eliminating potential bi-
ases arising from unobserved individual characteristics, and for industry, municipality, and year
e¤ects, to parse out any industry or region characteristics or aggregate trends that might a¤ect
our outcomes. We further saturate the models and include trends by municipality to account
for any di¤erential pre-existing trends in pay. Finally, we control for rm-worker (match) xed
e¤ects. In those specications, the e¤ect of the reform on the sensitivity of pay to performance
is identied from individuals who stay in the same rm after the deregulation, and not from
those who move to other rms, with potentially di¤erent structures of compensation, after the
reform. In all specications, we nd that the coe¢cient on the interaction between the measure
of rm performance and the "On the Spot Firm" treatment variable is negative and statistically
signicant for CEOs.
We also nd that the reform increased the xed component of compensation for both
CEOs and department managers, but not for workers. This suggests that the reform a¤ected
the structure of compensation, with rms substituting towards xed and away from variable,
performance-based, pay. The fact that our data cover the universe of private sector rms al-
lows us to estimate the e¤ects by quartiles of rm prots. The results show that the overall
estimates obtained for the performance-pay relationship are driven by the largest rms, in the
fourth quartile, whilst the performance-pay sensitivity for smaller rms is statistically insig-
nicant. This suggests that smaller rms have lower agency costs, and need to rely less on
incentive-based pay to their managers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the theoretical back-
ground and related literature. In section 3 we describe the data used and present descriptive
statistics, and describe the "On the Spot Firm" experiment and the identication strategy.
Section 4 studies the e¤ect of the reform on rm creation. Section 5 presents the quasi-natural
experiment and discusses the results of the deregulation on the xed and performance-based
components of compensation for workers across the corporate hierarchy. The last section con-
cludes.
2 Theoretical background and related literature
In this section we discuss the theoretical literature that studies the relationship between com-
petition and managerial incentives, and review the empirical studies of that relationship. The
theoretical link between competition and compensation is analyzed by Schmidt (1997) and Raith
(2003) in a principal-agent setting. They investigate the e¤ect of competition on the distribu-
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tion of prots across rms, and how this a¤ects compensation schemes. Vives (2008) provides a
more general model to analyze the e¤ect of competition on product and process innovation. The
e¤ect of an increase in competition on cost-reducing investments depends on both the residual
demand and the elasticity of residual demand faced by the rm. An increase in the number of
competitors decreases residual demand but increases the elasticity of demand, such that, the
net e¤ect on R&D e¤ort is ambiguous.
In Schmidt (1997) the competitive environment in which the rm operates a¤ects the con-
tract between the manager (agent) and the shareholder (principal). An increase in product
market competition reduces the prots of a rm, and increases the probability of liquidation.
This has two opposing e¤ects on the incentives to exert e¤ort. On the one hand, it induces
the manager to work harder for a cost reduction in order to avoid liquidation and keep her job,
and the owner to provide steeper incentives to the manager. On the other hand, if competition
reduces the rms size, it reduces the value of a given cost-reduction to the owner, and owners
are induced to provide atter marginal incentive schemes. Overall, the e¤ect of competition on
incentives is ambiguous.
Raith (2003) extends Schmidts model by allowing for endogenous entry and exit of rms.
As a result of increased competition, prices and prots decrease, leading some unprotable
rms to exit until the remaining rms prots are restored. Thus, surviving rms become
larger and so have a larger incentive to reduce costs: that is, the rst of Schmidts e¤ects
dominates, eliminating the ambiguity. Raiths model predicts unambiguously that an increase
in competition leads rms to provide stronger incentives to their managers to reduce costs if
the increase in competition is through changes in market size or the elasticity of substitution
and if it increases output per rm. However, if competition increases through a reduction in
the cost of entry, such as the "On the Spot Firm" program we analyze here, new rms enter
the market and the rm-level output decreases. The lower rm-size reduces the value of a cost
reduction and so rms provide weaker managerial incentives, atter incentive schemes.
In this paper we test Raiths main theoretical prediction for the case of lower entry costs.
By analyzing the "On the Spot Firm" reform we can identify precisely how an increase in
competition resultant from lower entry costs a¤ects the performance-based pay of executives and
workers. Our nding of a reduced performance-pay sensitivity following increased competition is
consistent with the theoretical prediction. To our knowledge this is the rst paper to investigate
empirically that prediction for the case of a comprehensive reduction in entry costs domestically.
Other theoretical papers, including Hermalin (1992), Scharfstein (1988) and Hart (1983),
study how competition a¤ects managerial slack through increases in information about market
conditions. The idea is that if there is a common component to costs across rms, more com-
petition gives managers, who need to achieve prot targets, less scope to engage in managerial
slack than if costs are independent across rms. This can have e¤ects on the steepness of in-
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centive contracts. However, generally, this literature delivers ambiguous results about the e¤ect
of competition on incentive pay.
An empirical literature has investigated the e¤ect of competition on performance related
pay. Cuñat and Guadalupe (2005, 2009) study the e¤ects of changes in foreign competition on
the structure of compensation, and in particular the performance-based sensitivity of executives
and workers. Cuñat and Guadalupe (2005) exploit the 1996 appreciation of the British pound as
a quasi-natural experiment. They nd that the higher level of foreign competition is associated
with increased performance-pay sensitivity in the UK, in particular for executives. Cuñat
and Guadalupe (2009) study how import penetration (instrumented by exchange rates and
tari¤s) a¤ects compensation and incentives of US executives, and nd that increased foreign
competition leads to stepper performance-pay.
Cuñat and Guadalupe (2009b) and Hubbard and Palia (1995) study deregulation in the
banking and nancial sectors in the United States. They nd that deregulation resulted
in a stronger pay-performance relationship for a panel of executives. Burgess and Metcalfe
(2000), study how competition a¤ects the use of incentive schemes using data from survey ques-
tions, answered by managers in a sample of around 2000 British rms, on whether they use
performance-related pay, and a measure of perceived competition. They nd that competition
has a positive e¤ect on the probability that the rm will use performance-related pay. Aggarwal
and Samwick (1999) study how strategic interaction between rms a¤ects executive compensa-
tion. They use Herndahl indices and measures of own-rm and also rival performance. In some
specications their estimates of both own and rival pay-performance sensitivities are positive.
Our paper is also related to the more general papers about performance-pay (see, for example,
Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Blanchower and Oswald, 1988; and more recently Bell and Van
Reenen, 2012).
3 Data and identication strategy
3.1 Data and descriptive statistics
The main data source used for our analysis is the Portuguese longitudinal linked employer-
employee data Quadros de Pessoal (QP). These data have been collected annually, since 1985,
by the Portuguese Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity and include information on workers
and their employers. All private sector rms with at least one employee are requested by law
to answer the survey and each rm and each worker have a unique registration number which
allows them to be traced over time. The information in general refers to the situation observed
in the month when the survey is collected (October), and it covers the rm, each of its plants
and each of its workers. The survey is administrative and the legal requirement that the rm
6
has it available for consultation results in an unusually high coverage and reliability.2 Firm
level information in the QP include, for example, the year of creation, industry, location, total
number of workers employed in the rm, number of establishments, sales volume, legal setting of
the rm and ownership structure (equity breakdown among domestic private, public or foreign).
Information on workers includes, for example, gender, age, education level (schooling), level of
skill, occupation, type of contract of employment, hiring date in the rm, promotions, monthly
hours of work (normal and overtime) and earnings, which are split into each of its components
(base wage, seniority payments, regular and irregular bonuses and overtime pay).
Although the QP data include information on salary and bonuses, they do not include long
term incentive plans (LTIP) or stock options as most rms are not publicly traded. Hence, our
empirical analyses will consider the real monthly pay of the worker. This variable is constructed
by summing: (i) the base pay - gross wage for the normal hours of work; (ii) tenure related
payments; and (iii) regular and irregular bonuses. Our results are therefore to be interpreted
as the e¤ect of competition on performance-pay sensitivity for short-term compensation (salary
and bonuses). Although we do not consider LTIP, short-term compensation has been shown to
be the most responsive part of pay to performance, and thus the more relevant component of pay
for this type of study. For example, Bell and Van Reenen (2012), using di¤erent data sources
for the UK, show that the e¤ect of performance on long-term incentive plans is substantially
smaller than that for salary and bonus. They argue that while bonuses can be explicitly related
to contemporaneous performance, LTIP are usually set by rms as a multiple of base pay, while
performance is only implicitly taken into account. Therefore, insofar we only have information
on regular pay and bonuses, our estimates reect the sensitivity of the most responsive part of
pay to performance, and the e¤ect of "On the Spot Firm", for short term compensation.
Our measure of rm performance is the rms annual accounting prots before tax. Since our
data covers the universe of rms, most of them are not publicly traded; as such, we are unable
to use stock-market returns to measure rm performance, as in previous studies.3 Information
on prots is available from the SCIE (Enterprise Integrated Accounts System), a census of rms
since 2004, covering detailed balance-sheet information for rms; and from its predecessor for
the years prior to 2004, the IAE (Annual Survey of Enterprises), which covered a representative
sample of around 40 000 rms. Both datasets are collected annually by the O¢ce for National
Statistics (INE) and have a rm identier compatible with that of QP-LEED. Our analysis
focuses on the period between 2002 and 2009, and is restricted to private sector manufacturing
and service rms, excluding agriculture, shing and mining, covering 46 industries. Table A.1
in the Appendix reports the description (and the percentage distribution of observations) of
2The legal requirement that the data is publicly available at the rm is related to the monitoring by the
Ministry that the rm conforms to the law.
3Previous work has shown the relevance of using prots to measure performance in the analysis of compens-
ation schemes (see Cunat and Guadalupe, 2005; Bushman and Smith, 2001; Blanchower and Oswald, 1988).
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the SIC 2-digit industries considered. The resulting LEED sample contains information on
440,544 distinct rms (contributing 1,881,740 rm-year observations) and 3,700,412 workers
(contributing 15,534,057 worker-year observations) over the period. We identify the creation of
new rms using the reported year the rm was constituted. A rm is considered to be a start-up
if the year of creation is equal to the year of analysis.4 The distribution of rms (existing rms
and startups) and workers by year is shown in Table 1. We observe that 20% of the new rms
were created in municipalities with "On the Spot Firm" o¢ces in 2005, rising to 76% within 4
years.
[Table 1 about here]
The QP data includes information on the occupational category of the workers. We exploit
this information to investigate the e¤ects of the deregulation on the performance pay of CEOs,
department managers and workers. Occupations are recorded in the QP data in accordance with
the International Standard Classication of Occupations (ISCO) 1988. We use the information
on occupations at the 3-digit level, and our analysis distinguishes between CEOs (ISCO88 cat-
egory 121), Department managers (ISCO88 categories 122 and 123) and the remaining workers
(including all other occupational categories).5 Our regressions control for observable charac-
teristics of the workers: gender, age and tenure (and their squares), the type of contract of
employment (whether open-end or closed-end contract) and the education level of the worker.6
We also control for characteristics of the rm, such as the log of the rms size (measured by
the number of employees), the prots of rival rms, the ownership status (private, public or
foreign owned, depending on whether more than 50% of the rms social capital is owned by
private, public or foreign investors), whether the rm is an exporter, and whether the rm is
multi-plant.7
We merge the QP-LEED with the IAE-SCIE data to obtain the information on the rms
4Because the survey is collected in October, we recover some information on rm births if the reported year
of creation is t   1 but the rm is observed for the rst time in t. In these cases, we set the year of creation of
the rm to t:
5The denition of the ISCO88 categories for directors is as follows: ISCO88 121 - Directors and Chief Ex-
ecutives; ISCO88 122 - Production and Operations Department Managers; ISCO88 123 - Other Department
Managers, which includes managers of the following departments: Finance and administration, Personnel and
industrial relations, Sales and marketing, Advertising and public relations, Supply and distribution, Computing
services, Research and development, Other.
6The level of education is recorded according to the International Standard Classication of Education
(ISCED), approved by UNESCO in 1997. The correspondence between ISCED levels and years of schooling
in Portugal is: ISCED 1 - rst and second stages of basic education (up to 6 years of schooling); ISCED 2 - lower
secondary education (9 years of schooling); ISCED 3 - upper secondary education (12 years of schooling); ISCED
5/6 - higher education (more than 15 years of schooling, corresponding to university degrees). In Portugal, there
is no degree corresponding to ISCED level 4; and it is not possible to distinguish between ISCED levels 5 and 6
from the data.
7 Information on exporters is from the International Trade dataset collected by the Portuguese National
Institute of Statistics (INE). This dataset includes the universe of monthly export and import transactions by
Portuguese rms.
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prots.8 For estimation purposes, for the regressions on the structure of compensation, we
exclude very small rms, with fewer than 10 workers, for which we believe the theory is inap-
plicable, and also outlier observations with the highest and lowest 1% of prots to try to avoid
the worst of measurement errors in that variable.9 Finally, in order to ensure that our results
are not distorted by the specics of newly created rms (and also to evade a possible endogen-
eity problem below), we restrict the sample to rms that existed in 2004. Detailed descriptive
statistics for the merged estimation sample are presented in Table 2, while Table A.2 reports
summary statistics for all variables.
As expected, the CEOs are the group of workers with higher real monthly pay (ln(monthly
pay) of 8.2), followed by department managers with mean monthly pay of 7.7 log points; the
other workers have signicantly lower average monthly pay of 6.6 log points. Only 17% of CEOs
in our sample are women; and 72% of them hold a university degree. CEOs are more likely
than other workers to be employed by foreign owned rms (19%) and by rms that are export-
oriented (74%). On the other hand, the rest of the workers are generally younger (average of
37 years of age), have lower levels of educational attainment (only 8% of them hold a university
degree, and 51% of them have only attained ISCED level 1) and the rate of female labour market
participation in this group is much larger (44%). The rms where these workers are employed
are mostly private national rms (82%). Regarding the "On the Spot Firm", 34% (37%) of
the observations in the CEOs (Other workers) group are in municipalities with one-stop shops
during the period of observation.
[Table 2 about here]
3.2 Quasi-natural experiment: the "On the Spot Firm" program
This section describes the "On the Spot Firm" business registration reform. At the start of
2005 Portugal languished in 113th place of the World Banks Ease of doing business index. The
bureaucracy associated with setting up a rm was extensive, with several Ministries involved
which between them required an entrepreneur to full 11 procedures and complete 20 forms. In
all, it took around 78 days and fees equivalent to around 13.5 % of GDP per capita to achieve.10
In May 2005, the newly elected government created the Unit for Coordination of Administrative
Modernization (UCMA) to coordinate across ministries, which in turn led the Ministry of Justice
to create the "On the Spot Firm" (Empresa na Hora) program to reduce red tape associated
with setting up a new rm.11 This initiative was unannounced and unanticipated. It established
one-stop shops where entrepreneurs can register a company in less than an hour (the average
8Due to the sampling nature of the IAE-SCIE in the years prior to 2004, the resulting merged sample has a
lower number of observations. Summary statistics for the merged sample are reported in Tables 2 and A.2.
9The results remain robust whether or not those observations are included.
10This compares with an average of 6.8% in the OECD (World Bank, 2006).
11http://www.empresanahora.pt/ENH/sections/ENn_homepage
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time in 2007 was 47 minutes), at a single o¢ce desk and at a cost of around 3% of GDP
per capita. In the one-stop shops, the legal and commercial registration is completed and the
company identication card, the corporate tax payer number and the social security number
are all handed over in the same day.
One-stop shops were launched in July 2005 in four municipalities.12 The program expanded
over time, and by the end of 2009 there were 164 one-stop shops dispersed in municipalities
throughout the country, covering most of mainland Portugal and the autonomous region of
Madeira.13 Figure 1 of Fernandes et al (2014) shows the opening dates and geographical disper-
sion of the one-stop shops between 2005 and 2009. An entrepreneur can register a new company
under the "On the Spot Firm" program in any of the one-stop shops located across Portugal.
However, as documented by Branstetter et al. (2013), the fraction of rms registered outside
their local municipality is trivially small.14
Our identication strategy exploits the cross-municipality-specic and cross-time variation
in the implementation of the "On the Spot Firm" program to estimate the e¤ect of the reform
on the performance-pay sensitivities for workers across the corporate hierarchy, in particular
for top executives. As explained above, the policy change was unanticipated, and arguably
exogenous.15 We exploit the variation in the timing of adoption of the reform across municip-
alities for identication, to obtain di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimates of changes in the slope of
performance-pay following the reform. Our treatment variable in the following sections, Spotmt,
takes the value of 1 in the years when and after a one-stop shop was introduced in municipality
m, and 0 otherwise. Therefore, rms and individuals in municipalities with "On the Spot Firm"
o¢ces are the treatment group.
This identication strategy relies on the assumption that the introduction of the program was
not systematic; specically, that it was not correlated with pre-existing trends in the outcome
variables in municipalities. Thus below we control for pre-existing trends by municipality and for
a host of other factors that might a¤ect outcome variables. As an initial test of our identication
strategy, we test whether the order in which municipalities adopted the "On the Spot Firm" is
correlated with prior trends in the variables used in our analysis. We test whether municipalities
that adopted the reform in the rst two years (2005 and 2006) di¤er from municipalities that
adopted the reform later (from 2007 onwards) in terms of growth trends in the years prior to the
policy change.16 In Table 3 we report pre-reform average trends for the group of municipalities
12Coimbra, Aveiro, Barreiro and Moita.
13Administratively, Portugal is divided into 308 municipalities which are the seats of local administrative and
executive power.
14The program allows registration of all companies except state-owned companies or rms in industries with
industry-specic requirements, or which require special permits. These are mainly in the nance, insurance and
transportation sectors. We exclude observations in these industries from our analysis.
15Although there were also local elections in October 2005 for the municipality chief executive, the introduction
of "On the Spot Firm" shops seems unrelated with political a¢liation. As discussed in Branstetter et al. (2013),
40% of the municipalities with one-stop shops had heads from the main opposition Social Democrat party.
16This test of the identication strategy follows Bruhn (2011).
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that adopt late (Column (1)) and early (column (2)), the di¤erences and the p-values for the
null hypotheses that the means (proportions) are equal. There are no signicant di¤erences
and so we can conclude that the order in which municipalities introduced the program is not
correlated with pre-reform trends.
[Table 3 about here]
4 E¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" program on rm entry
This section investigates the e¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" on rm entry, to assess the validity
of the reform as a source of higher entry, for the main analysis in the paper, on the e¤ects on
the pay-performance sensitivity. We then investigate in the following sections the prediction,
arising from Raiths model, that competition through lower entry costs, and higher rm entry,
leads to atter incentives and thus lower pay-performance elasticities. We studied the e¤ect of
the "On the Spot Firm" program on rm entry in previous work (Fernandes et al., 2014) and
the remainder of this section is based on that work. To estimate the e¤ect of the reform on the
number of new rms created by municipality-industry-year, we run the following specication,
using a negative binomial model:
NewFirmsmst = Spotmt + d() + mst (1)
Where the "On the Spot Firm" dummy variable (Spotmt) takes the value of 1 in the years when
and after a one-stop shop was introduced in municipality m, and 0 otherwise.17 We control
for di¤erent sets of xed e¤ects d(), including industry indicators to parse out any industry
characteristics that may a¤ect entry (ds); year indicators to capture any aggregate shocks (dt);
and municipality xed e¤ects to control for municipality time invariant factors that may a¤ect
rm entry (dm). We cluster standard errors by municipality. Table 4 reports results, with
di¤erent sets of those xed e¤ects included across the columns of the Table. The results suggest
that the entry deregulation increased the number of new rms. The coe¢cient on Spotmt is
always positive and statistically signicant (at 1% level). In particular, the di¤erence in the logs
of the expected counts of new rms is estimated to be between 0.08 and 1.21 units higher after
the reform. That is, it increased the number of start-ups by up to 4.2 per sector, municipality
and year (see ME in column 3). Therefore, the reform has an economically meaningful e¤ect
on the number of new rms. Results remain robust if we use a linear specication instead of
the negative binomial, for the same count variable.18
[Table 4 about here]
17Figure 1 shows the opening dates of the one-stop shops in Portuguese municipalities across the country.
18These results on rm entry following a reform that simplies business registration are consistent with those
reported by Branstetter et al. (2013) and Bruhn (2011).
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5 E¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" on managers pay: Quasi-
natural experimental evidence
The previous section shows that the "On the Spot Firm" deregulation program is positively
related to rm entry and hence to measured competition. In this section we use the deregulation
reform as a quasi-natural experiment, that exogenously increased competition, to study how
it a¤ected the pay of CEOs and department managers relative to all remaining workers in a
corporation. In what follows we present and discuss the results obtained for the e¤ects of the
creation of one-stop-shops on the monthly returns of the three groups of workers.
5.1 E¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" on managers total pay
We start by investigating the e¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" program on total pay of CEOs
and department managers relative to other workers in rms located in treated municipalit-
ies relatively to those in non-treated municipalities. To that end we estimate the following
specication.
lnwijmkt = +1Spotmt+2Managerkit+3(SpotmtManagerkit)+X
0
it+Z
0
jt+d()+ijmkt
(2)
where the dependent variable is the log of monthly real pay of worker i (in rm j, municipalitym)
in year t. Spotmt is our treatment dummy for municipalities with one-stop shops; as explained
above, it takes the value of 1 in the years when and after the "On the Spot Firm" was introduced
in municipality m, and zero otherwise.19 Managerkit is a vector of manager dummies, including
a dummy variable for whether the worker is the CEO, and a dummy variable for whether the
worker is a department manager; "other workers" in the rm is the omitted category. X 0it is
a matrix of individual characteristics, including age and tenure and their squares, occupation
and type of contract; and Z 0jt is a matrix of rm characteristics, including the log of size, the
ownership structure (domestic private, public or foreign), a dummy for whether the rm is
an exporter, and a dummy for whether the rm is multi-plant, and the rms rivals prots.
Controlling for rm size is important in the narrative above, because the larger the rm the
larger the pay-o¤ to a given reduction in costs. It has also long gured in theoretical and
empirical work on executive compensation, see, for example, Rosen (1982, 1990) and Kostiuk
(1990) respectively.
Industry (ds), municipality (dm) and time (dt) dummies are also included to absorb aggregate
business shocks and account for unobserved industry characteristics and municipality-specic
factors that may a¤ect compensation. The nature of the linked employer-employee data we
19Some municipalities have more than one one-stop shop. Our treatment dummy is set to 1 after the rst
shop was opened.
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use also allows us to include individual, or worker-rm (match) xed e¤ects in our specica-
tions, di, and dij , respectively. These e¤ects help to control for potential biases arising from
individual heterogeneity on the patterns of job mobility, di¤erent compensation policies across
rms and sorting of workers across rms. Although the policy reform was unexpected and
despite us showing previously that early adopting municipalities are not statistically di¤erent
from late adopters in terms of pre-reform trends in compensation, to make sure that there are
no di¤erential pre-existing trends in wages, we saturate the model even further and include
municipality-specic linear trends, dm  t. These absorb any potential trends in compensation
at the municipality level. ijmkt is an error term assumed to be white noise. In all of our
specications standard errors are clustered at the municipality level to account for potential
correlation between observations within the same municipality, the level of introduction of the
policy.
Our coe¢cients of interest are those in the vector 3, the coe¢cients on the interaction
between the reform variable and the managers dummy variables. Each element of vector 3
captures the di¤erential e¤ect of the deregulation on the total pay of CEOs and of department
managers, respectively, relative to other workers, in treated municipalities relative to workers in
municipalities not a¤ected by the "On the Spot Firm". If 3 is positive, the reform is associated
with an increase in total pay of CEOs, or department managers, relative to other workers in
the rm.
Table 5 reports the results from estimating Eq.(2) with di¤erent sets of xed e¤ects controlled
for across the columns of the Table. The coe¢cient on the interaction between the reform
variable and the CEO dummy is positive and statistically signicant across all specications,
and estimated at around 0.06. This suggests that the reform increased the pay of CEOs in
treated municipalities relative to other workers by about 6 percent, relative to those in una¤ected
municipalities. Similarly, the introduction of the reform is associated with increased relative
pay of department managers in a¤ected municipalities by around 5 percent. The coe¢cient
on the Spotmt variable, 1, is statistically insignicant, suggesting the reform had no e¤ect on
total pay of workers, the omitted category. These results are basically a specialization to a
more tightly dened set of workers of our previous results, which showed that the On the Spot
Firm program increased the returns to higher levels of skill and higher education  Fernandes
et al (2014). In addition to these program e¤ects, Table 5 also reinforces the importance of rm
size and the fact that CEOs and managers earn more than other workers even after allowing
for personal and rm characteristics.
[Table 5 about here]
In sum, results from Table 5 show that the reform, and the extra competition it induced,
increased the total pay of CEOs and department managers, but not that of workers. Higher
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total pay may indicate an increased incentive to avoid bankruptcy; however, as we discussed
above, this is not the same as observing that competition increases the link between pay and
performance on the margin. It is the latter that is our main topic of interest, and so in the
next section we ask whether, in line with Raiths theoretical prediction, the increased competi-
tion from lower entry costs led to weaker managerial marginal incentives, and atter incentive
schemes.
5.2 E¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" on managers xed and performance-
based pay
In the previous section we estimate the e¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" program on total
managers pay. However, managers compensation is generally comprised of a xed component
and of a variable component which is a function of performance. In this section we analyze the
e¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" entry deregulation on both the xed and performance-related
components of managers pay. We are particularly interested in testing Raiths theoretical
prediction that a reduction in entry costs will lead rms to provide weaker marginal managerial
incentives, and thus atten the incentive schemes. To do this we estimate the following equation:
lnwijmkt = + 1Spotmt + 2Prot jt + 3Managerkit + 4(Spotmt  Prot jt) + (3)
+5(Spotmt Managerkit) + 6(Managerkit  Prot jt) +
+7(Spotmt Managerkit  Prot jt) + X
0
it + Z
0
jt + d() + dmt+ ijmkt
The dependent variable is the log of monthly real pay of worker i (in rm j, municipality m)
in year t. Spotmt is our treatment dummy for municipalities with one-stop shops; as explained
above, it takes the value of 1 in the years when and after the "On the Spot Firm" program was
introduced in a municipality, and zero otherwise. Prot jt is our measure of rm performance
explained in section 3. Most of the rms in our sample are not publicly traded, and there is no
stock market information for them, therefore we use real accounting prots in millions of Euros
at the rm-year level as the measure of performance.20 As before, Managerkit includes a set
of dummies for wether the worker is a CEO or a department manager, with "other workers"
being the omitted category. To study the e¤ects of the reform on both xed and performance-
based pay of workers across the corporate hierarchy, and to provide an additional benchmark
against which to gauge the e¤ects on CEOs and managers pay, we interact the reform variable
(Spotmt) with the indicators for managers. The estimated coe¢cients on these interactions
measure the di¤erential e¤ects of the reform on compensation for managers relative to workers.
In addition we interact prots with the manager indicators to allow di¤erent workers to have
di¤erent degrees of sensitivity to performance and with the program dummy in order to allow
20This also follows Cuñat and Guadalupe (2005) and Blanchower and Oswald (1988).
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for general changes in the performance-pay relationship induced by the program. X 0it is a matrix
of individual characteristics, including age and tenure and their squares, occupation and type
of contract of the worker; and Z 0jt is a matrix of rm characteristics, including the log of size,
the ownership structure (domestic private, public or foreign), a dummy for whether the rm is
an exporter, and a dummy for whether the rm is multi-plant, and the rms rivals prots.
The elements of 5 in Eq. (3), are the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimates of the e¤ect of the
"On the Spot Firm" deregulation on the xed component of CEOs and department managers
compensation, relative to other workers, in treated municipalities; the e¤ects on the workers
xed pay is given by 1, the stand-alone reform variable. The coe¢cient on the performance
variable, 2 measures the performance-pay sensitivity for workers in the sample, while the ele-
ments of 6 capture the di¤erential sensitivity of pay to performance for CEOs and department
managers. Our main interest lies in the triple interaction term between the reform dummy,
the performance measure and the manager indicators: each element in the vector 7 measures
the change in the slope of the performance-related pay for CEOs and Department managers in
a¤ected municipalities relative to workers following the "On the Spot Firm" deregulation. If
7 is negative, consistent with the theoretical prediction from Raith (2003), rms in municip-
alities that experienced increased competition following the reform, reduced the slope of their
post-reform performance-related pay schemes. The e¤ect on the workers is measured by 4.
As explained in the previous section, we control for industry (ds), municipality (dm) and time
(dt) dummies and include individual, or worker-rm (match) xed e¤ects in our specications,
di and dij , respectively, thus accounting for individual heterogeneity on the patterns of job
mobility, di¤erent compensation policies and sorting of workers across rms. We also include
municipality-specic linear trends, dm  t to absorb secular trends at the municipality level in
wages. ijmkt is a white noise error term. We cluster standard errors by municipality in our
specications.
The results from estimating Eq. (3) are reported in Table 6, with di¤erent combinations
of the xed e¤ects included in the columns of the Table. In column (1) we control for worker
xed e¤ects and include year, municipality, industry dummies and linear trends by municipality,
while in column (2) we replace worker, industry and municipality xed e¤ects with rm-worker
match xed e¤ects. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) suggest that rival rm performance may
also a¤ect performance-based incentives o¤ered by the rm. To take such e¤ects into account,
in columns (3) and (4) we control additionally for a measure of the performance of rival rms,
and its interaction with the reform dummy. The measure of rivals performance is calculated
as the average asset return of all other rms in the same 2-digit sector, multiplied by the rms
assets.21
The results show that the basic performance-pay sensitivity for CEOs relative to that of
21This follows Cuñat and Guadalupe (2005).
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workers, is positive and statistically signicant, and is estimated at around 0.004, that is an
increase in rm prots by a million results in increased relative CEOs pay by 0.4%. This
estimate is relatively low, suggesting that incentive mechanisms are relatively weak. However,
this low estimate is consistent with previous ndings of very small pay-performance sensitivities
(see Conyon et al., 1995; Bell and Van Reenen 2012). The estimates of the sensitivity of pay
to performance for department managers and workers is statistically insignicant, suggesting
that only the pay of CEOs is linked to performance. We also nd that rm size is a signicant
determinant of pay, with larger rms paying higher wages.
[Table 6 about here]
The next set of estimates in Table 6 shows the coe¢cients of interest, the di¤erence-in-
di¤erence estimates of the e¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" reform on the sensitivity of pay to
performance. The di¤erential slope for CEOs in municipalities a¤ected by the reform is negative
and statistically signicant at 1% across specications. In column (4), where we identify the
e¤ects from workers that remain in the same rm, and not from those that move between rms,
with potentially di¤erent structures of compensation, after the reform, and control for rivals
prots, we estimate that the reform reduced the performance-pay sensitivity of CEOs by 0.003.
That is, the CEOs pay-performance relationship becomes atter after the entry deregulation.
We obtain a smaller negative e¤ect for department managers, while no statistically signicant
e¤ect is found for workers. Controlling for rivals performance does not signicantly a¤ect the
other coe¢cients. The result of a negative e¤ect of increased competition following the reduction
in entry costs on the CEOs performance-pay slope is consistent with the theoretical result that
increased rm entry leads rms to atten managers incentive schemes.
The fact that we nd no relationship between rm performance and the pay of department
managers, and a lower e¤ect of the deregulation on that slope than that for CEOs, is consistent
with the denition in the ISCO88 classication: while the Directors and Chief Executives group
(occupation 121) "head enterprises or organizations, determine and formulate policies, plan,
direct and coordinate the activities of enterprises or organizations", the tasks of the group of
Department Managers include to "plan, direct and coordinate particular activities, under the
broad guidance of the directors and chief executives, and in consultation with managers of
other departments or sections". Therefore, since the Department Managers are not involved in
dening the rms general policy and strategy, as the CEOs are, it is expected that their pay is
less, if at all, sensitive to performance and less a¤ected by increased competition as the CEOs
pay is.
The coe¢cients on the interaction terms between the reform variable (Spotmt) and the CEO
and department manager indicators, respectively, capture the di¤erential e¤ect of the reform on
the xed component of the incentive contracts. We obtain positive and statistically signicant
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coe¢cients for both CEOs and department managers, suggesting that the reform increased the
relative xed component of CEOs pay by around 6% and that of department managers by 5%,
with no statistically signicant e¤ects found for workers pay. These results taken together
show that the reform is associated with an increase in the xed component and a decrease in
the slope of the incentive contract of CEOs in treated municipalities, suggesting that the reform
changed the structure of compensation, with rms substituting into xed pay and away from the
variable, performance-based, component. For department managers, only the xed component
is signicantly a¤ected, with increases in relative xed pay.
In sum, our results show that the "On the Spot Firm" reform is associated with a attening
of the incentive schemes o¤ered to CEOs by rms in treated municipalities. We estimate
a negative and highly statistically signicant coe¢cient on the interaction term between the
reform dummy and the measure of rm performance for CEOs, suggesting a decrease in the
sensitivity of pay to performance as a result of the entry deregulation. These ndings provide
empirical support for the theoretical prediction in Raith (2003) that increased competition
through a fall in entry costs (as with the reform we analyze) leads rms to provide weaker
incentives to their top managers. The nding that the reform is associated with increases in
the xed component of pay for CEOs and department managers could be the result of higher
demand for these executives resultant from the increased rm entry, leading rms to pay more
for these executives. It is also consistent, as discussed above, with higher incentives to avoid
bankruptcy  i.e. the non-marginal element of managerial incentives.
As we noted above, our results coupled with the opposite e¤ects found by Cuñat and Guada-
lupe (2005, 2009) in response to increases in competition induced by increases in market size
or the elasticity of substitution, represent a complete test of and vindication of the theoretical
predictions of Raith (2003). The e¤ect of increased competition on managerial incentives really
does depend on what drives the increase.
5.3 E¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" on managers performance-based pay,
by quartiles of prots
In this section we allow the xed and variable components of pay, and the e¤ect of the "On
the Spot Firm" program on compensation, to vary across the distribution of rm prots. An
advantage of our data relative to most previous studies, which have focussed on managers com-
pensation structure in large, traded, rms, is that it includes information for the universe of
private sector rms. This allows us to estimate the e¤ects of the entry deregulation separately
for large and small rms. This is important because smaller rms could have di¤erent compens-
ation structures from large rms, and lower performance-pay sensitivities if smaller rms have
lower agency costs, as discussed in Cuñat and Guadalupe (2005). On the other hand, existing
empirical evidence suggests that performance-based pay is higher in small rms (see e.g. Jensen
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and Murphy, 1990). Therefore it is of importance to assess whether the e¤ects estimated in
the previous section are widespread across the prot distribution, or are driven by large rms,
which have been the focus of most of the existing literature on executive compensation.
In what follows, we estimate the e¤ects of the deregulation for di¤erent quartiles of rm
prots. To avoid endogenous changes in prots after the deregulation to a¤ect our results, we
dene quartiles of the prot distribution in 2004, before the entry deregulation, and divide rms
into four prot quartiles. We then estimate a specication similar to Eq. (3) but interacting
each term with quartile dummies, dened as IPjq = 1 if rm j is quartile q of prots in 2004, and
zero otherwise, where q = 1; :::; 4 with q = 1 being the lowest quartile of prots. The coe¢cients
on the interaction between the terms in Eq (3) and the quartile dummies measure the e¤ects
for workers in rms from the rst to the fourth quartiles of prots.
[Table 7 about here]
Results for the specications that allow the xed and variable components of pay, and the
e¤ects of the experiment on both components, to di¤er by prot quartiles are reported in Table 7.
The rst set of coe¢cients, on the terms CEOProfitIPjq measure the basic performance-pay
sensitivity of CEOs by quartiles of rm prots. The estimates show that for CEOs in the highest
quartile (q = 4) the basic performance-pay sensitivity is positive and statistically signicant,
and of larger magnitude and statistical signicance than the overall slope in Table 6, while no
statistically signicant coe¢cients are obtained for CEOs in smaller rms. This suggests that
the slope of the performance-pay relationship estimated in the previous section is driven by
the largest rms, which is consistent with the hypothesis that smaller rms have lower agency
costs and hence less need for performance-related managerial incentives. The coe¢cients on the
interactions Dpt:Mng:  Profit  IPjq are statistically insignicant across all prot quartiles,
suggesting that department managers pay is insensitive to performance, consistent with the
results from Table 6.
The next set of estimates reported in Table 7 (CEO(Dpt:Mng:)  Spot  Profit  IPjq)
measure the e¤ect of the experiment on the slope of the performance-pay contract for managers
in a¤ected municipalities across prot quartiles. Consistent with the results in the previous
section and with the theory, we nd that the "On the Spot Firm" decreased the performance-
pay sensitivity of CEOs. Again the e¤ects are driven by the largest rms, in the fourth quartile
- the coe¢cients on the interactions CEO  Spot Profit IPj4 are negative and statistically
signicant at the 1% level, with no statistically signicant results for CEOs or for department
managers in smaller rms. The e¤ects of the program on the xed component of CEOs and
department managers pay, relative to that of workers, for di¤erent quartiles are given by the
terms CEO(Dpt:Mng:)  Spot  IPjq. The estimated coe¢cients of these terms show that the
reform increased the xed component of department managers pay across all prot quartiles,
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with managers in the largest rms beneting more (see column (4) of Table 7). The reform also
increased the xed component of pay of CEOs in rms in the third and fourth prot quartiles,
in treated municipalities, while those in smaller rms are una¤ected by the program. Other
workers in the smallest rms seem to have lost on average from the reform, the coe¢cient on
SpotIPj1 is negative and statistically insignicant.
22 In sum, the results reported in this section
show that the overall estimates for the xed and performance-related components of managers
pay, as well as the e¤ect of the entry reform on those components, are driven by the largest
rms with no e¤ects found for manages in smaller rms. These results suggest that smaller
rms rely less on this type of managerial incentive mechanism.
6 Conclusion
A number of theoretical papers have studied the e¤ect of increased product market competi-
tion on managerial incentives (Vives, 2008; Raith, 2003; Schmidt 1997; Scharfstein, 1988; Hart,
1983). Overall the literature delivers ambiguous results about the e¤ect of competition on
performance-related pay as incentive scheme. However, by allowing the endogenous entry and
exit of rms to eliminate the prot e¤ect for surviving rms, Raith (2003) predicts unambigu-
ously that competition measured by larger market size or increased elasticity of substitution
leads to an increase in incentive provision, while increased competition due to a reduction in
entry costs leads rms to provide weaker incentives to their CEOs. The reason for the latter
result is that new rm entry reduces rm-level output, and thus the value of a cost-reduction,
leading to atter managerial incentives and lower pay-performance elasticities.
In this paper we investigate that prediction empirically using the "On the Spot Firm"
business registration reform introduced in Portugal in 2005 as a quasi-natural experiment. By
exploiting the exogenous change in entry costs that increased rm entry across industries and
municipalities, we are able to identify the causal link between competition and performance-
based pay of managers, avoiding the caveats surrounding common measures of competition.
In line with the theoretical prediction, our estimates suggest that the increase in competition
resultant from the "On the Spot Firm" reform decreased the steepness of performance-based
pay. This e¤ect is observed for CEOs but not for department managers or for other workers in
the hierarchy. As a result of the reform, rms in municipalities with "On the Spot Firm" o¢ces
decreased the elasticity of pay to performance for their top executives but not for other workers,
relative to other rms. We nd that the overall performance-pay sensitivity and the e¤ect of
the reform on the slope of the incentive contracts for CEOs are driven by the largest rms, with
no statistically signicant e¤ects obtained for smaller rms. This suggests that small rms have
22Also included in the specications in Table 7, but not reported for space considerations, are the interaction
terms Profit  IPjq and Spot  Profit  I
P
jq (all coe¢cients on those terms are statistically insignicant); and
interaction terms CEO(Dpt:Mng:) Profit IPjq (all coe¢cients are positive and statistically signicant).
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lower agency costs and hence can rely less on incentive pay to their managers. We also nd
that the reform is associated with increases in the xed component of pay, for both CEOs and
department managers. After the entry deregulation, rms changed the structure of managers
compensation substituting xed for variable pay.
In our empirical specications we control for individual xed e¤ects, thus eliminating po-
tential biases arising from unobserved individual characteristics, and we control for industry,
municipality, and year e¤ects, to parse out any industry or region characteristics or aggregate
trends that might a¤ect our outcomes. In all specications, we nd that the coe¢cient on the
interaction between the measure of rm performance and the "On the Spot Firm" treatment
variable is negative and statistically signicant for CEOs. Finally, we also control for rm-
worker (match) xed e¤ects identifying the e¤ect from individuals who stay in the same rm
after the deregulation, and not by those that move rms, which may have di¤erent compensa-
tion structures. Our results provide novel evidence of a causal link between increased product
market competition through lower entry costs and the performance-pay of executives. We nd
empirical support for the theoretical prediction in Raith (2003) that lower entry costs lead to
weaker managerial incentives.
In addition to testing Raiths predictions, however, our results have potentially important
lessons for policy-makers. In an era of low growth and austerity, governments will be attracted
to policies such as deregulation which apparently o¤er extra growth at no extra public expense.
Our results have suggested that reducing barriers to entry to a sector not only potentially
stimulates growth but also reduce the sensitivity of top executive pay to rm performance.
At least in some sectors, this may enhance their political attractions. On the other hand, we
have found that the xed portion of executive pay was increased by the reduction of entry
barriers and so it is not clear that such policies will reduce overall pay. Where the existence
of performance-related components has been deleterious for other reasons, however, such as
arguably in the banking sector, our results might be interpreted as hinting at a partial solution.
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8 Tables
Table 1: Sample size, employer-employee full sample
Year All rms Start ups % Start ups CEOs Department managers Other workers
"On the Spot"
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2002 211,113 13,389  3,862 59,046 1,733,353
2003 215,354 15,603  5,067 52,695 1,698,841
2004 218,817 14,593  5,520 52,752 1,732,098
2005 233,514 16,509 20.00 6,373 56,379 1,862,363
2006 235,094 17,147 42.32 2,930 59,912 1,870,955
2007 255,757 20,182 51.24 3,678 65,789 1,981,376
2008 258,943 20,413 66.42 3,891 66,150 2,015,322
2009 253,148 17,382 76.26 3,978 62,017 1,936,227
Total 1,881,740 135,218 35.29 35,299 474,740 14,830,535
Source: Own calculations based on Portugal, MTSS (2002-2009).
Table 2: Detailed summary statistics of ln(monthly real pay) by groups of workers, estimation matched
sample
ln(monthly real pay) No. of Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. P10 P90
CEOs 17,849 8.203 8.275 0.857 7.038 9.218
Department managers 162,705 7.724 7.754 0.767 6.701 8.661
Other workers 7,403,219 6.642 6.573 0.604 6.085 7.407
All employees 7,583,773 6.669 6.586 0.633 6.090 7.469
Note. These statistics were computed using the estimation sample. Source: Own calculations
based on Portugal, MTSS (2002-2009).
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Table 3: Pre-reform averages of outcome variables
Late adopters Early adopters Di¤erence P-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
New rms 0.109 0.115 -0.006 0.923
(0.044) (0.031) (0.061)
Prots -0.391 -1.350 0.958 0.150
(0.316) (0.667) (0.664)
Wages
Overall -0.033 -0.039 0.006 0.793
(0.019) (0.008) (0.025)
CEOs -0.169 -0.103 -0.066 0.431
(0.065) (0.053) (0.085)
Department managers -0.131 -0.122 -0.09 0.867
(0.042) (0.024) (0.053)
All other workers -0.033 -0.040 0.007 0.777
(0.019) (0.008) (0.024)
Note: outcome variables are measured as initial growth trends (between 2002 and 2004) of
average wages, average prots, number of new rms at the municipality level. Standard errors
in parentheses. The p-value relates to the test of the null hypothesis of equality between the
means (proportions).
Table 4: E¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" program on rm creation
E¤ect of "On the Spot Firm" on the number of rm start-ups (negative binomial)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
On the spot rm 0.825*** 0.984*** 1.208*** 0.227*** 0.079***
(0.109) (0.112) (0.164) (0.017) (0.020)
ME 2.473*** 3.135*** 4.242*** 0.585*** 0.196***
Constant 0.656*** -0.283*** -0.238*** 0.417*** 0.287***
(0.067) (0.062) (0.074) (0.043) (0.047)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes
Note: The dependent variable is the number of new rms created. One observation per municipality,
industry and year corresponding to 56,782 records. ME stands for the marginal e¤ect of the "On
the Spot Firm". Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality, in parentheses. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 5: E¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" program on managers total pay
(1) (2) (3)
CEOSpot 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.057***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Dpt.Mng.Spot 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.048***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Spot -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
CEO 0.093*** 0.094*** 0.057***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Dpt.Mng. 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.049***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
ln(rm size) 0.015** 0.015** 0.054***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes
Munictime trend Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Worker FE Yes Yes
Match (worker-rm) FE Yes
Nb. Obs. 7,583,773 7,583,773 7,583,773
R2 0.041 0.043 0.036
Note: The dependent variable is the log monthly pay of workers. Fur-
ther covariates include gender, age and tenure (and their squares),
type of contract (whether or not xed term), education levels, ln size
of rm, whether rm is exporter and whether it is multiestablishe-
ment, and ownership of the rm. Robust standard errors, clustered by
municipality, in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 6: E¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" program on managers performance-pay
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CEOProt 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Dpt.Mng.Prot 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Prot -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CEOSpotProt -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Dpt.Mng.SpotProt -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SpotProt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CEOSpot 0.066*** 0.062*** 0.066*** 0.061***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Dpt.Mng.Spot 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.050***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Spot -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
CEO 0.088*** 0.052*** 0.086*** 0.049***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Dpt.Mng. 0.073*** 0.048*** 0.072*** 0.047***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Prot2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(rm size) 0.016*** 0.054*** 0.016** 0.054***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
rivalprot -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
CEOSpotrivalprot -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Dpt.Mng.Spotrivalprot -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Spotrivalprot 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes
Munictime trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Worker FE Yes Yes
Match (worker-rm) FE Yes Yes
Nb. Obs. 7,578,081 7,578,081 7,451,848 7,451,848
R2 0.043 0.036 0.042 0.035
Note: The dependent variable is the log monthly pay of workers. Further covariates
include gender, age and tenure (and their squares), type of contract (whether or not
xed term), education levels, ln size of rm, whether rm is exporter and whether it is
multiestablishement, and ownership of the rm. Robust standard errors, clustered by
municipality, in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 7: E¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" program on managers performance-pay by prot quartiles23
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CEOProtIPj1 -0.008 -0.005 -0.008 -0.005
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
CEOProtIPj2 0.056 0.024 0.057 0.024
(0.075) (0.060) (0.075) (0.060)
CEOProtIPj3 -0.069 -0.082 -0.072 -0.104
(0.110) (0.108) (0.120) (0.113)
CEOProtIPj4 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Dpt.Mng.ProtIPj1 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Dpt.Mng.ProtIPj2 -0.084*** -0.056** -0.078*** -0.053*
(0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.028)
Dpt.Mng.ProtIPj3 -0.059* -0.030 -0.068** -0.037
(0.033) (0.032) (0.034) (0.032)
Dpt.Mng.ProtIPj4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CEOSpotProtIPj1 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
CEOSpotProtIPj2 -0.169 -0.106 -0.167 -0.104
(0.160) (0.157) (0.161) (0.158)
CEOSpotProtIPj3 0.133 0.128 0.138 0.152
(0.117) (0.110) (0.124) (0.115)
CEOSpotProtIPj4 -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Dpt.Mng.SpotProtIPj1 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Dpt.Mng.SpotProtIPj2 -0.135 -0.129 -0.143 -0.135
(0.108) (0.119) (0.111) (0.122)
Dpt.Mng.SpotProtIPj3 0.091** 0.072 0.098** 0.079*
(0.042) (0.046) (0.042) (0.046)
Dpt.Mng.SpotProtIPj4 -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CEOSpotIPj1 0.031* 0.035** 0.038** 0.041**
(0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
CEOSpotIPj2 0.006 -0.014 0.013 -0.007
(0.052) (0.048) (0.055) (0.049)
CEOSpotIPj3 0.074** 0.072* 0.062** 0.057*
(0.037) (0.039) (0.031) (0.031)
CEOSpotIPj4 0.077*** 0.071*** 0.075*** 0.069***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Dpt.Mng.SpotIPj1 0.018** 0.037*** 0.019** 0.037***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Dpt.Mng.SpotIPj2 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.013
(0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015)
Dpt.Mng.SpotIPj3 0.048*** 0.045*** 0.047*** 0.045***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Dpt.Mng.SpotIPj4 0.058*** 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.055***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
SpotIPj1 -0.010*** -0.014*** -0.010*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
SpotIPj2 -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.000
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
SpotIPj3 -0.006* 0.001 -0.006 0.002
(Continued on next page)
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Table 7: ( continued from previous page)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
SpotIPj4 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Prot2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(rm size) 0.015** 0.053*** 0.015** 0.053***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
rivalprot -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
CEOSpotrivalprot 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Dpt.Mng.Spotrivalprot 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Spotrivalprot -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes
Munic*time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Worker FE Yes Yes
Match (worker-rm) FE Yes Yes
N 7,583,773 7,583,773 7,457,580 7,457,580
R2 0.043 0.036 0.042 0.035
Note: The dependent variable is the log monthly pay of workers. Further covariates include
gender, age and tenure (and their squares), type of contract (whether or not xed term),
education levels, ln size of rm, whether rm is exporter and whether it is multi-plant, and
ownership of the rm. IPj1 is an indicator variable that equals one if rm j is in the qth
quartile of prots in 2004. Also included but not reported for space considerations are the
interaction terms Prot*IPj1 and Spot*Prot*I
P
j1 (all coe¢cients on those terms are
statistically insignicant); and interaction terms CEO (Dpt.Mng.)*IPj1 (all coe¢cients are
positive and statistically signicant). Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality, in
parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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9 Figures
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Fig. 1: "On the Spot Firm" introduction by year and municipality
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A Appendix
Table A.1: SIC2 - Industries
Industry % Obs.
15 Manuf. of food, beverages & tobacco 5.99
17 Manuf. of textiles 5.26
18 Manuf. of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 5.84
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; Manuf. of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harnes & footwear 2.95
20 Manuf. of wood & prods of wood & cork, except furniture; Manuf. of straw & plaiting materials 2.08
21 Manuf. of pulp, paper and paper products 0.74
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 1.40
24 Manuf. of chemicals & chemical prods; Manuf. of coke, rened petroleum prods & nuclear fuel 1.67
25 Manuf. of rubber and plastic products 1.67
26 Manuf. of other non-metallic mineral products 3.60
27 Manuf. of basic metals 0.68
28 Manuf. of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 4.02
29 Manuf. of machinery and equipment n.e.c 2.45
31 Manuf. of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 1.19
32 Manuf. of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 0.85
33 Manuf. of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 0.33
34 Manuf. of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 2.41
35 Manuf. of other transport equipment 0.67
36 Manuf. of furniture; others manufacturing activities, n.e.c. 2.23
37 Recycling 0.19
40 Electricity, gas & water 0.20
41 Water collection, treatment and distribution 0.27
45 Construction 13.96
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of fuel 0.56
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 10.44
52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and HH goods 11.79
55 Hotels and restaurants 4.73
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines 0.04
62 Air transport 0.00
63 Supporting & auxiliary transport activities; travel agencies and other tourist assistance 0.46
64 Post and telecommunications 1.20
65 Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding 0.00
70 Real estate activities 0.07
71 Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and HH goods 0.14
72 Computer and related activities 1.30
73 Research and development 0.00
74 Other business activities 5.54
80 Education 0.01
85 Health and social work 2.10
90 Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities 0.35
91 Activities of membership organizations n.e.c. 0.00
92 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 0.21
93 Other service activities 0.38
Note. Sample size: 7,583,773 worker-year observations (estimation sample). Source: Own calculations based on Portugal, MTSS
(2002-2009)
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Table A.2: Summary statistics: means of covariates by groups of workers
Covariate CEOs Department managers Other workers
ln(monthly real pay) 8.203 7.723 6.642
Prots (real, in millions) 1.671 2.341 3.479
Spot 0.335 0.387 0.373
Women 0.170 0.268 0.438
Age 47.229 43.117 37.708
Tenure 11.635 10.550 8.476
Closed-end contract 0.127 0.112 0.260
Education (baseline: ISCED1)
ISCED2 0.074 0.119 0.218
ISCED3 0.120 0.222 0.190
ISCED56 0.718 0.498 0.080
ln(size of rm) 4.293 4.427 4.790
Exporter 0.735 0.668 0.642
Multi-plant 0.358 0.408 0.396
Ownership status (baseline: private national)
Public 0.021 0.015 0.025
Foreign 0.192 0.165 0.149
No. of observations 17,849 162,705 7,403,219
Note. Means were computed using the estimation sample. Source: Own calculations based on Portugal,
MTSS (2002-2009).
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